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1 Introduction
The concept of opinion leadership plays a considerable role in sociology and
marketing. Originally, it goes back to work by the Lazarsfeld group’ (see, e.g.,
Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, and Lazarsfeld et al. 1968). Following some critique
on the original model Troldahl (1966) suggested his so-called two-cycle flow of
communication model. Roughly speaking, it distinguishes between two phases
in the communication process. Phase one is a flow of information from a sender
(e.g., the mass media) to the members of the society, which is assumed to be
a one-step process, i.e., the information goes directly to all members of the
society. Phase two is a flow of influence on beliefs and behavior, which is
assumed to be a two-step process. In a first step highly self-confident actors
with strong opinions who are called opinion leaders form their own opinions
based on additional information provided by experts, such as academics, while
in a subsequent second step their opinion influences their so-called followers.
These feel attracted by the opinion leaders holding them in high esteem and,
under certain conditions, they are prepared to adopt their opinion for their
own behavior.1 This implies that opinion leaders possess some power over their
followers as they may be able to influence their followers’ behavior.2
Since Troldahl’s contribution the literature on opinion leadership has
provided a strong body of knowledge of how and why opinion leaders influ-
ence followers choices (see Hoyer and Stockburger-Sauer 2007). Based upon
Troldahl’s model in van den Brink et al. (2011) we laid the foundations for
a theoretical investigation of different opinion leader-follower structures and
introduced a power and a satisfaction score, which allow us to compare and
contrast different structures.
Our basic model considers societies being partitioned into opinion lead-
ers, followers, and independent actors, who have to make a decision on an
exogenous proposal. In line with Troldahl’s (1966) model we assume that the
proposal is distributed among all actors. Following Sinha and Raghavendra
(2006) each actor faces a binary choice: by choosing the yes-action it can sup-
port the proposal in order to obtain a new state of the society, and by choosing
the no-action it can reject it in order to remain with the status quo. Before
making its choice each actor forms its own opinion on the proposal, i.e., without
being influenced by any other actor. We call this the actor’s action inclina-
tion.3 An action inclination contains the information which available state of
1 Note that opinion leaders provide their followers just with their own opinion on the
information distributed in phase one and do not provide them with any additional factual
information. In this sense followers consider them as (credible) information sources for the
decision regarding their own behavior (see, for instance, Deutschman and Danielson 1960
or, more recently, Solomon et al. 2010).
2 As a result of this influence, the ability of the followers to determine the outcome of
the collective choice, i.e., their power to (do something with respect to the outcome of the
collective choice), might be affected.
3 Note that in line with the corresponding generic definitions of an inclination and a
preference in our context we treat both notions as synonyms. We make use of the notion
inclination as our analysis is closely related to the strand of literature on the measurement
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the society an actor prefers to become reality, i.e., whether the outcome of the
collective choice should be that the proposal is accepted or rejected. Hence, an
actor can either have the action inclination to choose the yes- action in order
to support the proposal or the no-action in order to reject it. This implies that
there exists a relationship between an action inclination as defined above and
the outcome of the collective choice. In addition to their action inclinations,
the actors possess also constitutional inclinations, which, in the present con-
text, are related to the organization of the society, or to make use of the words
of Vanberg and Buchanan (1988) they are an actor’s “preferences over poten-
tial alternative ‘rules of the game’ for the social community or group within
which he operates. ... They reflect preferences that would emerge if he were to
participate in choosing the constitution, in the broadest sense.” In our context
they determine (i) whether an actor is an opinion leader, follower, or indepen-
dent actor, (ii) which opinion leader(s) an actor chooses if it is a follower, and
(iii) the procedure for followers to follow their opinion leaders. For the purpose
of our analysis we assume that constitutional inclinations are exogenous. This
implies that (i) we have a given partition of our society into opinion leaders,
followers, and independent actors, and that (ii) our opinion leader-follower re-
lationships are already fixed, i.e., it is given which actors might influence the
choice of action of certain other actors by exercising some power over them.
Moreover, (iii) we assume that a unanimity requirement applies for follow-
ers to follow their opinion leaders. Action inclinations are left ‘unspecified’.
In line with Vanberg and Buchanan (1988) and Heckathorn (1987), who have
introduced the distinction between both types of inclinations, we assume a lex-
icographical ordering of both types: constitutional inclinations are regarded to
be on a ‘higher level’ than action inclinations as action inclinations have to be
formed within the framework given by the constitutional inclinations. As we
assume constitutional inclinations to be exogenous from now onwards, when
we refer to action inclinations, we will just use the term inclinations.
In line with the inherent idea of opinion leadership we suppose that
via informal discussions of the proposal the inclinations of the opinion leaders
are becoming public information prior to the real decision, which implies that
each follower is aware of the inclination of its opinion leader(s).4 Only after
these discussions, all actors will secretly (or simultaneously) choose their ac-
tions. These correspond with an actor’s inclination, if it is an opinion leader
or independent actor. If it is a follower with just one opinion leader, it will
- independently of its own inclination - adopt the inclination of its opinion
leader. If a follower has more than one opinion leader then it will choose an
action against its own inclination if, and only if, a certain fraction of its opin-
ion leaders have the same inclination, and this differs from its own inclination.
For the purpose of the present paper we consider the specific, but quite usual,
of power which goes back to Hoede and Bakker (1982). What they - and we in van den
Brink et al. (2011) - call an inclination is called an action inclination in the present paper.
4 While our model allows that the public discussions may change the inclinations of some
actors, we suppose that when choosing their action, and after that, inclinations do not alter.
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case that this fraction is equal to one, i.e., unanimity.5 Finally, based on the
individual choices of all actors, a decision-making mechanism determines the
outcome of the collective choice, i.e., whether the proposal is adopted or not.
We assume that the collective choice is made by simple majority of the actions
chosen by the actors.
As tools for the analysis of different opinion leader-follower structures
van den Brink et al. (2011) introduced two scores being based on the notions of
power and satisfaction where the latter contains the former as one component
(see van den Brink and Steffen 2012). In the voting power literature power
is, usually, ascribed to an actor if, given the chosen actions of the others, by
changing its own action, the actor changes the outcome. It is said that the
actor has a swing. Hence, roughly speaking, power in this context is defined
as the ability of an actor, i.e., what the actor is able to do (by changing its
action) against some resistance of others (represented by those chosen actions
of the others, which are not in line with the ‘new’ action of the actor in
question) irrespective of the actual occurrence of this resistance (see van den
Brink and Steffen 2008 referring to Braham 2008). While this definition of
power is sufficient for many applications, it implies a number of simplifying
assumptions (see Morriss 1987/2002:154-156). Among others it assumes (i)
that actors choose an action in line with their inclination, and (ii) that each
actor’s choice of action is not influenced by another actor. The implication
of (i) is that for measurement purposes it is sufficient to consider the actions
individually chosen by the actors and the resulting outcome, and to ignore the
fact that inclinations are usually part of any definition of power defined as an
ability. Following Morriss (1987/2002:26), ‘abilities are things that we can do
when we want’. As our opinion leader-follower collective choice situations allow
for situations under which both assumptions above are violated, we have to
relax both. This implies that for our purposes we have to consider the actors’
inclinations for the measurement of power. Hence, in our context we ascribe
power to an actor if, given the inclinations of the others, an actor by changing
its inclination can enforce a change in the outcome via a change of its action.
The power score that is introduced in van den Brink et al. (2011) is based on
such power ascriptions and informs us about the power distribution among
the members of a society with respect to their ability to affect the state of the
society concerning a specific outcome.
According to van den Brink and Steffen (2012) satisfaction should be
ascribed to an actor if its inclination corresponds with the outcome. This as-
cription is based upon the generic definition of satisfaction being the fulfillment
of a desire.6 As a powerful actor in the sense of the power definition above can
5 In the current context this assumption appears to be in line with other findings in
the literature. For instance, Asch’s (1951, 1952, 1956) results imply that when a group
takes a unanimous position, people may feel more pressure to conform. A very recent study
underpinning this view comes from an experiment conducted by Verhulst and Levitan (2009).
They found that participants were more likely to conform to the attitudes expressed by a
unanimous group than by a non-unanimous group.
6 Note that satisfaction has to be distinguished from the ‘preference free’ notion of success,
which is ascribed if an actor’s choice of action corresponds with the outcome. Both notions
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itself determine the outcome it desires, power is one feasible source of satisfac-
tion. However, also a powerless actor can gain satisfaction. This satisfaction
can result out of different types of luck (see van den Brink and Steffen 2012).
Hence, we can say that, in our context, satisfaction is an important notion as
it is the most extensive notion to characterize the position of an actor in a
society (or organization) while the notion of power is of equal importance as
it informs us about the fraction of satisfaction that an actor can enforce itself
by the choice of its own action.7 The satisfaction score introduced in van den
Brink et al. (2011) and which is applied in this paper is based on the satisfac-
tion ascription defined above and, hence, tells us to which degree members of
the society can be expected to end up with an outcome that they desire. 8
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we provide a formal rep-
resentation of our model and our power and satisfaction scores. In Sect. 3,
which contains the main contribution of the present paper, we show that, in
the present context, our power and satisfaction scores satisfy even stronger
opinion leader properties than those studied in van den Brink et al. (2011).
Moreover, we introduce two different normalizations and provide full axiom-
atizations of both scores, which differ in the normalization only. Finally, in
Sect. 4 we wind-up the paper with a concluding remark.
2 Measuring power and satisfaction in opinion leader-follower
collective choice situations
2.1 The model
We represent the structure of our society and the ‘opinion leader-follower’
relations by a bipartite directed graph (or bipartite digraph) (N,D) with a
finite set of nodes N = {1, . . . , n} representing the actors, and D ⊂ N ×N a
coincide for the canonical set-up in the voting power literature and, hence, are often used
as synonyms. However, for the model in the present paper this is not the case. See van
den Brink and Steffen (2012) for a more detailed and critical discussion of the relationship
between both notions.
7 Consider, for example, collective decision making in the EU. In several countries there is
a growing opposition against ‘giving away sovereignty to Brussels’. This opposition clearly
focuses on power and ignores satisfaction. However, if a country aimed to increase its sat-
isfaction with the decisions made by the EU decision-making bodies, it might be useful to
accept a transfer of their current EU decision-making rights and, hence, their power, to the
EU. For example, suppose that the inclinations of The Netherlands and Germany coincide.
Then, if the Germans were acting as de facto dictators in the EU decision-making bodies,
The Netherlands having no longer any decision-making rights (and, hence, no power) would
always be satisfied even they could never be successful. Instead, if the decision-making rights
and power were more spread over the countries, one could expect that The Netherlands had
some power and would have been successful in some instances, but would have been less
satisfied. Hence, for the ‘optimal’ design of EU collective decision-making mechanisms one
needs to know the importance of satisfaction and its components such as power and success
for the member countries.
8 Note that this outcome needs not be in line with the action an actor has chosen. This
would have been the case if we had applied the notion of success instead of satisfaction.
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binary relation on N expressing that each actor is either an opinion leader, a
follower, or an independent actor. Since we take the set of actors N fixed, we
can represent a digraph (N,D) by its binary relation D. Let SD(k) = {j ∈
N : (k, j) ∈ D} be the set of successors of actor k ∈ N in digraph D, and
let PD(k) = {j ∈ N : (j, k) ∈ D} be the set of k’s predecessors in D. As we
assume that each actor is either an opinion leader, follower or independent
actor, we consider digraphs D such that:
|SD(k)| · |PD(k)| = 0 for each k ∈ N, (2.1)
where |X| denotes the cardinality of set X. Let OL(D) = {k ∈ N : SD(k) 6= ∅}
be the set of opinion leaders, FOL(D) = {k ∈ N : PD(k) 6= ∅} be the set of
followers, and IND(D) = N \ (OL(D) ∪ FOL(D)) be the set of independent
actors in D. Since, by assumption (2.1) we have that OL(D)∩FOL(D) = ∅, the
sets OL(D), FOL(D), and IND(D) form a partition of the set N . We denote
the collection of all bipartite digraphs on N by DN .
As explained in Sect. 1 we assume, that after the distribution of an
exogenous proposal each actor will form its own inclination. The chosen incli-
nations are represented by the inclination vector I = (I1, ..., In) ∈ {0, 1}n. This
is a vector which kth component, Ik, is 1 if actor k has the inclination to choose
the yes-action in order to support the proposal, and 0 if it has the inclination
to choose the no-action in order to reject it. Now, we can define an opinion
leader-follower collective choice situation as a pair (I,D) with I ∈ {0, 1}n and
D ∈ DN .
Next, let V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n denote the choice vector, that is a
vector which kth component, Vk, is 1 if actor k has chosen the yes-action, and
0 if k has chosen the no-action. Thus, the choice vector V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n
is given by:
Vk = Ik if k ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D),
and for k ∈ FOL(D) :
Vk =
{
x if Ij = x for all j ∈ PD(k)
Ik otherwise,
(2.2)
where x ∈ {0, 1}.
After all actors have chosen their actions, an outcome is resulting ac-
cording to the decision-making mechanism in use. This is given by the collective
decision function C: {0, 1}n×DN → {0, 1}, which assigns an outcome to every
pair (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n × DN , that is the value 0 if the collective decision is to
reject, and the value 1 if the collective decision is to accept the proposal. We
define the collective decision function by simple majority voting. Let for an
action x ∈ {0, 1} and choice vector V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n the number of
actors choosing the action x be denoted by nx(V (I,D)) = |{k ∈ N : Vk = x}|.
Restricting our analysis to situations in which the number of actors is odd,
the collective decision function is defined, for each (I,D), as follows:
C(I,D) =
{
1 if n1(V (I,D)) > n0(V (I,D))
0 if n0(V (I,D)) > n1(V (I,D)).
(2.3)
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2.2 Measuring power and satisfaction
In general, a score for bipartite digraphs representing opinion leader-follower
collective choice situations is a function f :DN → IRn, which assigns an n-
dimensional real vector to every bipartite digraph on N . Here we consider the
power and satisfaction scores introduced by van den Brink et al. (2011).
As explained in Sect. 1 we ascribe power to an actor if the actor, by
changing its inclination, is able to alter the outcome, i.e., if the actor has a
swing, and we measure the power of the actor in an opinion leader-follower
collective choice situation by the actor’s likelihood to be powerful. Formally,
an actor k ∈ N has a swing in (I,D) according to collective decision function
C if C(I,D) 6= C(I ′, D) with I ′k 6= Ik and I ′j = Ij for all j ∈ N \ {k}. In order




1 if k has a swing in (I,D)
0 otherwise.




POW k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (2.4)
As explained in Sect. 1 we ascribe satisfaction to an actor if the actor’s
inclination corresponds with the outcome and we measure the satisfaction of
the actor in an opinion leader-follower collective choice situation by the actor’s
likelihood to be satisfied. Formally, in order to ascribe satisfaction to an actor
we define a satisfaction score of an actor under a given inclination vector, i.e.,
for each (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n ×DN and k ∈ N :
SAT k(I,D) =
{
1 if C(I,D) = Ik
0 otherwise.




SAT k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (2.5)
3 Axiomatizations
In van den Brink et al. (2011) it is shown that both scores satisfy the following
four properties. Let us denote a generic score by f :DN → IRn.
Symmetry If SD(k) = SD(j) and PD(k) = PD(j), then fk(D) = fj(D).
Dictator property If D ∈ DN and h ∈ N is such that SD(h) = N \ {h},
then fh(D) = 2
n.
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Dictated independence If D,D′ ∈ DN and k ∈ N are such that |PD(k)| =
|PD′(k)| = 1, then fk(D) = fk(D′).
Opposite gain property Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ IND(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪
IND(D), and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Then fh(D′)− fh(D) = fj(D)− fj(D′).
Symmetry reflects a well-known principle stating that the value of a score for
actors with a symmetric position in the bipartite digraph is the same. The
dictator property states that, if there is a dictator (being a unique opinion
leader who is followed by all other actors), then the score of the dictator is
equal to the total number of possible inclination vectors. For the power and
satisfaction scores this reflects that a dictator has the power to change the
outcome by changing its own inclination and, if the dictator votes according
to its inclination, then the outcome will be the inclination of the dictator.
Dictated independence states that the score of a follower with one opinion
leader does not change as long as this follower is dictated by a sole opinion
leader, and reflects the idea that a follower who has only one opinion leader
will always follow this opinion leader. The opposite gain property states that,
if an actor becomes a sole opinion leader of another actor who was previously
independent, then the sum of the scores of these two actors does not change.
In other words, if the opinion leader gains, then this goes fully at the cost of
the follower.9
Next, we strengthen two axioms that were introduced in van den Brink
et al. (2011). First, horizontal neutrality states that, if a follower gets one
more opinion leader, then the sum of scores of the ‘new’ and an ‘old’ opinion
leader does not change. In other words, the change for the new opinion leader is
opposite but in absolute value equal to the change for an ‘old’ opinion leader.10
Second, the equal gain property states that, if a follower gets one more
opinion leader, then the changes in scores of this follower and of its new opinion
leader are the same.11
Horizontal neutrality Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D), g ∈ PD(j), h ∈
OL(D)∪ IND(D), and D′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Then fh(D′)− fh(D) = fg(D)−
fg(D
′).
Equal gain property Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D),
and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Then fh(D′)− fh(D) = fj(D′)− fj(D).
9 This principle is similar to several collusion neutrality properties introduced in the
context of cooperative TU-games by e.g., Lehrer (1988), Haller (1994) and Malawski (2004),
and applied to the so-called games with a hierarchical permission structure in van den Brink
(2010).
10 This is a stronger version of power neutrality for two opinion leaders.
11 This is a stronger version of the equal absolute change property. It is similar to Myerson’s
(1977) fairness for cooperative communication graph games, where it states that deleting
a communication link between two players changes their individual payoffs by the same
amount. In van den Brink (1997) this type of equal gain/loss property is stated in terms of
the above mentioned games with a hierarchical permission structure.
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Besides showing that the power and satisfaction scores satisfy these last two
stronger axioms, the main contribution of this paper is to show that adding
a further axiom which specifies what is the total sum of the scores over all
actors (i.e., a normalization), characterizes the power and satisfaction scores.
Obviously, since power and satisfaction are related but different concepts (see,
e.g., Dowding 1996 and van den Brink and Steffen 2012) each will satisfy
a different normalization. As normalization of power we take that the sum
of all scores is equal to the total number of individual swings, i.e., for each
inclination vector we count how many actors have a swing, and we add all
these swings over all inclination vectors. As normalization of satisfaction we
take that the sum of all scores is equal to the total number of individual
satisfaction ascriptions, i.e., for each inclination vector we count how many
actors have an inclination that corresponds with the outcome, and we add all
these satisfaction ascriptions over all inclination vectors.
Power normalization For every D ∈ DN it holds that ∑k∈N fk(D) =∑
I∈{0,1}n |{k ∈ N : k has a swing in (I,D)}|.
Satisfaction normalization For every D ∈ DN it holds that∑k∈N fk(D) =∑
I∈{0,1}n |{k ∈ N : Ik = C(I,D)}|.
Next, we state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 (i) Let the choice vector V be defined by (2.2). A score f :DN →
IRn is the power score POW :DN → IRn if, and only if, it satisfies symme-
try, the dictator property, dictated independence, the opposite gain property,
horizontal neutrality, the equal gain property, and power normalization.
(ii) Let the choice vector V be defined by (2.2). A score f :DN → IRn is the
satisfaction score SAT :DN → IRn if, and only if, it satisfies symmetry, the
dictator property, dictated independence, the opposite gain property, horizontal
neutrality, the equal gain property, and satisfaction normalization.
Proof
(i) POW satisfying symmetry, the dictator property, dictated independence,
and the opposite gain property is shown in van den Brink et al. (2011). It is
obvious that POW satisfies power normalization.
To show the equal gain property and horizontal neutrality12, let D,D′ ∈
DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D), and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Note that
POW k(I,D) = 1 implies that (i) POW k(I,D
′) = 1 for k ∈ {h, j}, and (ii)
POW k(I,D) = 0 implies that POW k(I,D
′) = 0 for all k ∈ PD(j). Since
[POWh(I,D) = 0 and POWh(I,D
′) = 1] if, and only if, [Ij = Ih 6= Ik for
all k ∈ PD(j) and C(I ′, D) 6= C(I,D) for I ′j = I ′h 6= Ih and I ′k = Ik for all
k ∈ N \ {h, j}] if, and only if, [POW j(I,D) = 0 and POW j(I,D′) = 1] if,
and only if, [POW k(I,D) = 1 and POW k(I,D
′) = 0 for all k ∈ PD(j)], POW
satisfies the equal gain property and horizontal neutrality.
12 In van den Brink et al. (2011) it is already shown that horizontal neutrality holds, if the
follower has exactly one opinion leader.
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To prove uniqueness, suppose that the score f :DN → IRn satisfies the
seven axioms, and let D ∈ DN . We prove that f must be equal to POW in
several steps. We first prove uniqueness in case there is at most one actor that
is an opinion leader by induction on its number of followers.
First, suppose that the opinion leader is a dictator, i.e., there is an
h ∈ N such that SD(h) = N \ {h}. Then the dictator property implies that
fh(D) = 2
n. Since each actor k ∈ N \ {h} has no swing, power normalization
implies that
∑
k∈N fk(D) = 2
n, and, thus,
∑
k∈N\{h} fk(D) = 2
n − 2n = 0.
Symmetry then implies that fk(D) = 0 is determined for all k ∈ N \ {h}.
Proceeding by induction, suppose that f(D̂) is uniquely determined
whenever |S
D̂
(h)| > |SD(h)|. Take a j ∈ N \ ({h} ∪ SD(h)). Note that j is an
independent actor since h is the only actor with successors. Consider D′ ∈ DN
given by D′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Dictated independence and the induction hypoth-
esis imply that fk(D) is uniquely determined for all k ∈ SD(h). Symmetry
implies that there is a constant c ∈ IR such that:
fk(D) = c for all k ∈ N \ ({h} ∪ SD(h)). (3.6)
The opposite gain property implies that:
fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fj(D)− fj(D′), (3.7)
where fh(D
′) and fj(D′) are given by the induction hypothesis. Then, with
power normalization, (3.6) and (3.7) yield (n − 1 − |SD(h)|) + 1 + 1 = n −
|SD(h)|+1 linearly independent equations with the n−|SD(h)|+1 unknowns,
c and fi(D), k ∈ N \ SD(h). Thus, f(D) is uniquely determined.
Next, we prove that f(D) is uniquely determined for all D ∈ DN by induction
on |D|.
From above it follows that f(D) is uniquely determined if D = ∅.13
Proceeding by induction, assume that f(D̂) is uniquely determined whenever
|D̂| < |D|.
We distinguish the following cases with respect to actor k ∈ N (of which at
least one must occur):
1. If |PD(k)| = 1, then dictated independence and the case with a dictator
considered before imply that fk(D) = 0 is uniquely determined.
2. If there is an j ∈ SD(k) with |PD(j)| = 1, then the opposite gain property
implies that
fk(D) + fj(D) = fk(D \ {(k, j)}) + fj(D \ {(k, j)}). (3.8)
Since actor j is as in case 1, we determined fj(D). With the induction
hypothesis fk(D \{(k, j)}) and fj(D \{(k, j)}) are determined. Thus, with
(3.8), fk(D) = fk(D \ {(k, j)}) + fj(D \ {(k, j)}) − fj(D) is uniquely de-
termined.
13 Note that this also follows from symmetry and power normalization.
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3. If there is an j ∈ SD(k) with |PD(j)| ≥ 2, then take h ∈ PD(j) \ {k}. The
equal gain property implies that
fk(D)− fk(D \ {(k, j)}) = fj(D)− fj(D \ {(k, j)}) (3.9)
and
fh(D)− fh(D \ {(h, j)}) = fj(D)− fj(D \ {(h, j)}). (3.10)
Horizontal neutrality implies that:
fk(D)− fk(D \ {(k, j)}) = fh(D \ {(k, j)})− fh(D). (3.11)
With the induction hypothesis the values in graphs D \ {(k, j)} and D \
{(h, j)} are uniquely determined. Thus, with the three linearly independent
equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11), the scores fk(D), fj(D) and fh(D) are
uniquely determined.
4. If |PD(k)| ≥ 2, then fk(D) is uniquely determined as in the previous case
(with the roles for k and j reversed).
5. Finally, symmetry implies that there is a constant c ∈ IR, such that fk(D) =
c for all k ∈ IND(D). Since above we determined all fj(D) for j ∈ OL(D)∪
FOL(D), power normalization determines c.
Thus, all fk(D), k ∈ N , are uniquely determined.
(ii) SAT satisfying symmetry, the dictator property, dictated independence,
and the opposite gain property is shown in van den Brink et al. (2011). It is
obvious that SAT satisfies satisfaction normalization.
To show the equal gain property and horizontal neutrality, let D,D′ ∈
DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D), and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. If C(I,D) 6=
C(I,D′), then it must hold that actor j initially had to vote against its incli-
nation and now can vote according to its inclination, because its new opinion
leader h has the same inclination. Moreover, all ‘other’ opinion leaders of j
must have the opposite inclination. Thus, for g ∈ PD(j) we have C(I,D) =
Ig 6= Ij = Ih and C(I,D′) = Ij = Ih 6= Ig. So, SAT j(I,D′) − SAT j(I,D) =
SATh(I,D
′)− SATh(I,D) = SAT g(I,D)− SAT g(I,D′) = 1.
Obviously, if C(I,D) = C(I,D′), then SAT j(I,D′) − SAT j(I,D) =
SATh(I,D
′) − SATh(I,D) = SAT g(I,D) − SAT g(I,D′) = 0. Thus, with (2.5)
we have SATj(D)− SATj(D′) = SATh(D)− SATh(D′) = SATg(D′)− SATg(D),
showing that SAT satisfies the equal gain property and horizontal neutrality.
Uniqueness follows similar as the uniqueness proof of part (i), but using
the alternative satisfaction normalization. uunionsq
Note that Theorem 1 characterizes the power score POW and the satisfaction
score SAT by the same axioms except the normalization axiom. Thus, we have
two comparable axiomatizations which exactly illustrate the difference between
power and satisfaction, which lies in the normalization being applied.14 This
expresses the basic difference in measuring power and satisfaction.
14 A similar difference is shown by van den Brink and Gilles (2000) for the outdegree
measure and the β-measure as scoring methods for directed graphs, highlighting that a
normalization is not always so innocent as it might appear.
12 R. van den Brink, A. Rusinowska, F. Steffen
4 Concluding remark
Having demonstrated that our power and satisfaction scores differ only in
the normalization that is used, we would like to wind-up this paper with a
remark on another difference between both scores. They also differ in how
they treat situations where a dictator exists. Power normalization and the
dictator property imply that the power score POW satisfies the property, that
the power score of actors who are subordinates to a dictator is equal to zero.15
Instead, satisfaction normalization and the dictator property imply, that the
satisfaction score SAT satisfies the property that in case there is a dictator,
the satisfaction score of a dictated actor is half of the satisfaction score of the
dictator. This expresses another difference between measuring satisfaction and
power. If a dictator exists, then the other actors cannot influence the outcome
of the voting process since they have to follow the dictator, and therefore their
power is equal to zero. However, also an actor that is subordinate to a dictator
might end up with an outcome that corresponds with its inclination. Thus,
ex ante a subordinate of a dictator will have its inclination coinciding with
that of the dictator in half of the cases. Since a dictator always dictates the
outcome, we arrive at a satisfaction score of the subordinate that is half of the
satisfaction score of the dictator.
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